Essays on the Readiness of Western Democracies for Future War

Storm Proofing: Preparing Armies for a Future War uses the edited volume approach from the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), which provides a mix of thorough essays which stand as a klaxon-like warning for those who will heed the concerns outlined therein. This will be potentially uncomfortable for politicians and decision-makers alike, given limited resources and never-ending expectations from the electorate which rarely seriously consider war.

The trio of editors collected a range of thoughtful responses to help assess the current state of select Western democracies with regard to future war, particularly in light of the long season of peace they have enjoyed since the Second World War. This volume uses three differing components by which this readiness can be measured in fifteen chapters with regard to what they call “fighting power” trifurcated as: the moral, the physical, and finally the conceptual. [pp. xiii-xv] Finally, the chapters feature varying numbers of footnotes which draw from an extensive select bibliography of sources supporting the text.

A few chapters will illustrate the volume’s contents which should be considered. Chapter #3, “Weatherproofing? The Transformation of the German Army, 2011-2024,” deals with the Bundeswehr’s challenges adapting to the 2014 Crimea events given an “Afghanistan mission” mindset [p. 39] that shifted away from the traditional Cold War view towards a counterinsurgency (COIN) / international peacekeeper focus. The peace dividend that followed the decades of Cold War waged between NATO and the USSR paradoxically left the 2011 version of the Bundeswehr a shell of its former self. Therefore, when the Russians struck Crimea in 2014 the Army’s commanding officer, Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais, expressed concern it could stand up to combat in a very frank statement that would have been alarming to many observers. [p. 39] One of the more salient points here is that politicians, not military personnel, establish budgets and plans that deeply impact what the Bundeswehr or other such organizations look like going forward, reactive to a fickle public opinion. Decades of peace for Germany meant they allowed many defense concerns to slide, such that facing a potential Russian threat required not merely a considerable financial investment but also their thinking had to pivot towards the plans, equipment and other elements needed to rebuild their capability. After all, as German Chief of Defense General Carsten Breuer stated, “a Russian attack on NATO territory is no longer an abstract possibility, but a tangible danger.” [p. 53]

Chapter #10, “Untangling the Sociology of Post-Human War” raises the interesting question of whether war can be post-human, that is without significant human control, run by AI or similar, and how it might look. According to Aristotelian logic, “war is…the most characteristically human thing” [p. 121] so the author provides ten key features of human vs post-human war which he explores: aims, emotion, chance, friction, fog, form of aggression, raiding, ritualized conflict, deception / surprise and centripetal / centrifugal. [p. 126] In post-human war, forms of aggression might become automated (and thereby reactive) whereas in human war they tend to be proactive. In the case of fog, for example, there would be different kinds of fog that influence fighting in the post-human arena due to the sophisticated AI / other systems involved and other inherent characteristics. As such, fog would still be present, just in different ways much like deception / surprise which might target parts of the hostile AI infrastructure instead of troops or a HQ. [p. 126]

The concluding section “Don’t Wait for the Storm!” imparts two important “contrasting imperatives” which are: the “need for strategic long-termism” which has to deal with the current reality of modern war, not merely old ideas, and conversely, the need for renewed understanding of short-termism, especially in the area of force development and procurement.” [p. 190-191] When one considers that the British, German and similar militaries have spent much of the last three decades as “less of a war machine and more of a COIN-operated machine” [p. 191] the need for serious rumination is desperately warranted. The demands of COIN (counterinsurgency) warfare do not translate well into the peer or near-peer warfare that could dominate future headlines, especially if the long-awaited clash between NATO and Russia transpires.

Storm Proofing offers a nuanced look at the current state of select Western European preparedness for future war. While it draws on some futurist speculation, it is rooted in solid research which provides a useful take on what can be done to safeguard the future of nations too long removed from the threat of war that until recently have shown little concern for the potential threats which are no longer merely existential. They need to take action now while they still can.

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Our Reviewer: Professor Schultz (Luzerne CC) has taught history and political science to community college undergraduates for over 20 years. Specializing in military history, particularly World War II and the Cold War-era, he has presented papers at the McMullen Naval History Symposium, the Society for Military History Annual Meetings, the Midwestern History Conference, and other venues. He contributed Chapter 12 “The Reich Strikes Back: German Victory in the Dodecanese, October-November 1943” to On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare, edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman (2020). His previous reviews for us include Warrior Spirit: The Story of Native American Patriotism and Heroism, Home Run: Allied Escape and Evasion in World War II, The Spanish Blue Division on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945, The ‘Blue Squadrons’: The Spanish in the Luftwaffe, Malta’s Savior: Operation Pedestal, Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy, Lawrence of Arabia on War, Dogwood: A National Guard Unit's War in Iraq, German Breakthrough in Greece: The 1941 Battle of the Pineios Gorge, and The Armed Forces of North Korea, Volume 1 - Korean People's Army Ground Forces Organisation, Strategy and Infantry.

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